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Abstract
We present a general consensus framework that allows to easily introduce a customizable
Byzantine fault tolerant consensus algorithm to an existing (delegated) proof-of-stake
blockchain. We prove the safety of the protocol under the assumption that less than 1/3 of
the block proposers are Byzantine. The framework further allows for consensus participants
to choose subjective decision thresholds in order to obtain safety even in the case of a
larger proportion of Byzantine block proposers. Moreover, the liveness of the protocol is
shown if less than 1/3 of the block proposers crash.
Based on the framework, we introduce Lisk-Bft, a Byzantine fault tolerant consensus
algorithm for the Lisk blockchain. Lisk-Bft integrates with the existing block proposal,
requires only two additional integers in block headers and no additional messages. The
protocol is simple and provides safety in the case of static proposers if less than 1/3 of
the block proposers are Byzantine. For the case of dynamically changing proposers, we
proof the safety of the protocol assuming a bound on the number of Byzantine proposers
and the number of honest proposers that can change at one time. We further show the
liveness of the Lisk-Bft protocol for less than 1/3 crashing block proposers.
1 Introduction
The Paxos protocol introduced by Lamport in [12] is the basis for most consensus protocols
solving the Byzantine agreement or more generally the state machine replication problem.
Starting with [6], there has been a multitude of different practical consensus protocols that
adapt the basic Paxos protocol to improve various aspects such as the efficiency and the
resistance against Byzantine faults. See [14] for a classification of different consensus protocols.
In this paper, we introduce Lisk-Bft, a Byzantine fault tolerant consensus algorithm
for the Lisk blockchain that follows this line of research. We assume that there is a set of
block proposers that can add blocks to a block tree via a given proposal mechanism (e.g.
round-robin). Ideally, we would like the block proposers to propose one block after another
always referencing the previously proposed block via a directed edge and hence forming a tree
with only one growing branch, i.e., a blockchain. However, due to the latency of communication
between the block proposers or deliberate attacks on the network, there can be multiple child
blocks of the same parent block and separate growing branches. We therefore need a consensus
protocol for block proposers to agree on one block at every height of the block tree.
We distinguish between honest block proposers that correctly follow the consensus protocol
and Byzantine block proposers that may behave arbitrarily. The consensus algorithm is
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supposed to allow block proposers to decide for exactly one block at every height of the block
tree such that the following properties are satisfied:
• Safety. Two honest block proposers never decide for conflicting blocks, i.e., blocks that
are not contained in one branch of the block tree.
• Liveness. An honest block proposer eventually decides for a block at any height.
• Accountability. A block proposer can detect if a Byzantine block proposer violates the
consensus protocol and can identify the Byzantine block proposer.
Note that the safety property implies that all decided blocks for an honest block proposer
are in one branch of the block tree and for any height two honest block proposers never decide
for distinct blocks.
In the case of Bitcoin [13], consensus is reached by block proposers choosing the chain
which required the most “work”. This rule does not satisfy both the safety and liveness property
above because no matter how late a block proposer decides for a block B, there is no guarantee
that the block B will be contained in the Bitcoin blockchain the Bitcoin network agrees on in
the future. The reason is that there always can be a different branch of the Bitcoin block tree
in the future with more “work” although for economic reasons it becomes increasingly unlikely
the more blocks are added to the block tree as descendants of B.
Tendermint [1] is one of the first blockchain consensus protocols achieving the safety, liveness
and accountability property above. Namely, Tendermint guarantees that as long as < 1/3
of the block proposers are Byzantine, both the safety and liveness property hold, which is
optimal for the partially synchronous system model introduced in [7]. The Tendermint protocol
proceeds in three distinct phases. Once the three phases are completed successfully, the block
proposers decide for a block B and proceed with proposing and deciding for a descendant
of B. This way the block tree in Tendermint is simply a path as for every height the block
proposers decide for a block before proceeding further. We call a consensus protocol with this
property fork-free. In contrast to that, we refer to a consensus protocol as forkful if there is no
requirement for block proposers to achieve consensus, i.e., decide for a block, before adding
further blocks to the block tree.
The Lisk-Bft protocol is a forkful protocol, where the block proposal can independently
progress before consensus is reached on blocks. This idea of using speculative Byzantine
fault tolerance in order to decrease the overhead has already been considered in [11] for the
state machine replication problem. We also believe that a forkful protocol can achieve better
performance in practice and significantly decrease the communication overhead as consensus
can be reached independent of the block proposal at any later point in time. For a more
detailed treatment of forkful versus fork-free consensus protocols and the message complexity
involved, see [3].
2 Model and definitions
In this section, we introduce the blockchain specific terminology as well as the underlying
network model. We do not consider the general state machine replication problem, but instead
assume that there is a block proposal mechanism, where time is divided into discrete slots and
for every time slot there is a designated block proposer. We also change some of the state
machine replication terminology to the blockchain specific context.
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A block tree is a directed tree with a designated root vertex referred to as genesis block and
a unique directed path from every vertex in the block tree to the genesis block. We refer to
the vertices in the block tree as blocks. We assume that blocks can contain arbitrary data such
as signatures or messages. Every block B has a corresponding height, denoted by h(B), which
is the number of edges of the unique path from that block to the genesis block. Note that the
genesis block has height 0. For a block B in the block tree, we call a block B′ ancestor if B′
is distinct from B and is on the directed path from B to the genesis block. Moreover, B′ is
called a descendant of B if B is an ancestor of B′. If there is a directed edge from a block B
to a block B′, then B′ is called the parent of B and B a child of B′. We further refer to the
subgraph induced by a path from a block without child to the genesis block as a branch or a
chain. For a given chain, the unique block without child block is referred to as the tip or head
of the chain. Two blocks are called conflicting if they are not contained in one branch of the
block tree, i.e., none is a descendant of the other.
We assume that there is a set P = {P1, P2, . . . , Pn} of n block proposers and a proposal
mechanism for block proposers to add child blocks of existing blocks to the block tree. We
distinguish between three types of proposers: A block proposer is honest if it follows the
consensus protocol. A block proposer is further called offline or crashed if it does not participate
in the consensus protocol, i.e., does not send any message to the network. Moreover, a Byzantine
block proposer can behave arbitrarily, e.g., maliciously violate the consensus protocol or crash.
Classic Byzantine fault tolerance consensus protocols typically yield guarantees assuming
certain upper bounds on the number of Byzantine block proposers. In the case of blockchain, in
particular proof-of-stake, we would rather have guarantees in terms of the stake represented by
a certain set of block proposers. We can model this by associating a weight ωP ∈ (0, 1] to every
block proposer P such that
∑
P∈P ωP = 1, where ωP can be thought of as the relative stake in
the case of a proof-of-stake blockchain. For the simplicity of exposition, we never explicitly use
the weights of the block proposers but rather say that > ω (or < ω) of the block proposers
satisfy a property X if the set M of block proposers satisfying property X has overall weight
larger (or smaller) than ω, i.e.,
∑
P∈M ωP > ω (
∑
P∈M ωP < ω). For instance, we regularly
assume that < 1/3 of the block proposers are Byzantine. For the Lisk blockchain we have
n = 101 block proposers and uniform weights ωP = 1/101 for all P ∈ P and the round-robin
block proposal scheme currently used for the Lisk blockchain satisfies that block proposers are
assigned slots proportional to their weight. The proposal mechanism could, however, also be
based on randomized leader election proportional to stake, for instance.
We further assume that the block proposers communicate by exchanging messages via
the underlying network. We model the network using the partially synchronous system model
introduced in [7]. The basic assumption of this model is that in general the network can behave
arbitrarily badly, i.e., messages are lost or have a huge delay, but eventually, from a time GST
onward, the network behaves nicely, i.e., all messages arrive reliably and with a delay of at
most ∆. The parameter GST is called the global stabilization time. Messages are further always
signed so that a block proposer can not be impersonated by another block proposer. The
block proposers are not required to know any bound on GST or ∆. Note that the eventually
synchronous network is only necessary to show the liveness of the consensus algorithm, but
not for the safety. In fact, this assumption on the underlying network is stronger than needed
for our consensus to work in practice and our results can easily be extended to a network
model with regular long enough good time periods, where the messages arrive reliably and
within ∆ time. These good periods only need to be long enough for block proposers to send
enough messages to decide for blocks. For the ease of exposition, however, we use the partially
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synchronous system model.
Note that due to the impossibility results of Fischer et al. [9, 8], stating that consensus is
impossible without randomization in an asynchronous message-passing system with at least
one Byzantine or crashing node, the partially synchronous system model is one of the weakest
models where consensus without randomization is possible. Known consensus algorithms
for asynchronous systems using randomization have worse guarantees in terms of maximum
number of Byzantine block proposers, a large number of local computations or a larger number
of messages [5, 10].
3 General consensus algorithm framework
In this section, we define a general consensus protocol with two types of messages, which is
later used as the basis for the Lisk-Bft protocol.
3.1 Protocol rules
We now describe the protocol rules of the general consensus framework. A proposer P can
send two types of messages, Prevote(B, T, P ) and Precommit(B, T, P ), where B and T are
blocks in the block tree such that T = B or T is a descendant of B (T is typically the tip of the
current chain of P ). In an implementation, B and T can be block hashes and P the public key
and signature of the block proposer P . We assume that both types of messages are added to
the blocks so that we can refer to the prevotes and precommits included in the blockchain from
the genesis block up to the tip T . Moreover, we shortly write that a block proposer prevotes
for B if P sends a Prevote(B, T, P ) message and equivalently that P precommits for B if
it sends a message Precommit(B, T, P ) for a block T . Next, we describe the protocol rules
that must be satisfied when sending prevote and precommit messages and the conditions for
block proposers to decide for blocks.
Definition 3.1. The prevotes and precommits send by a block proposer P ∈ P must obey
the following rules:
(I) For any two distinct messages Prevote(B, T, P ) and Prevote(B′, T ′, P ), it holds that
h(B) 6= h(B′).
(II) For any message Precommit(B, T, P ), the blockchain up to block T must include both
(a) one Prevote(B, ·, P ) message and
(b) Prevote(B, ·, ·) messages by > 2/3 of the block proposers.
(III) For any two messages Precommit(B, T, P ) and Prevote(B′, T ′, P ) with h(B) < h(B′)
at least one of the following conditions is satisfied:
(a) B′ is a descendant of B.
(b) The blockchain up to T ′ contains a block B¯ at height h(B¯) ≥ h(B) and Prevote(B¯, ·, ·)
messages by > 2/3 of the block proposers.
Let τP ∈ (13 , 1] denote the decision threshold of a block proposer P . Once proposer P receives
Precommit(B, ·, ·) messages by > τP of the proposers, proposer P decides for block B or
finalizes block B. This implies that P also decides for all ancestors of B.
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The basic intuition behind the protocol rules is that prevotes must not contradict, so block
proposers can cast only one prevote for every height by (I). Moreover, in order to send a
precommit for a block, a proposer has to have send a prevote for that block and received
prevotes by > 2/3 of the block proposers for it due to (II). Finally, the intuition behind (III)
is that a block proposer cannot change to a different chain without a justification, i.e., after
a precommit for block B, all prevotes of larger height must be for descendants of B or as a
justification there is a block B¯ at height h(B¯) ≥ h(B) with > 2/3 prevotes that allows the
block proposer to start sending prevotes on a different chain.
In the next subsection, we show how the decision threshold relates to the safety property
of the protocol. Intuitively, the higher the decision threshold of the block proposers, the more
block proposers can be Byzantine without losing the safety property. On the other hand, for
the liveness property, the decision threshold cannot be too high as otherwise a proposer may
never decide on a block.
3.2 Safety
In this section, we show that the safety property is fulfilled for the general consensus protocol
assuming a bound on the overall weight of Byzantine block proposers that depends on the
decision thresholds of the block proposers.
Theorem 3.2 (Safety). If there are < (τ − 1/3) Byzantine block proposers for τ ∈ (1/3, 1],
then any two honest block proposers with decision threshold at least τ never decide for conflicting
blocks.
Proof. Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that there are two conflicting blocks A and B as
well as an honest block proposer PA with decision threshold τA deciding for A and an honest
block proposer PB with decision threshold τB deciding for B. Without loss of generality let
h(A) ≤ h(B). Note that by assumption we have τ ≤ τA and τ ≤ τB.
If PA decides for A, it must have received a Precommit(A, ·, ·) messages by > τA of the
block proposers by definition. By assumption, τA ≥ τ and < (τ − 1/3) of the block proposers
are Byzantine so that there is a set of > 1/3 honest block proposers PA that must have sent
a Precommit(A, ·, ·) message. In particular, by property (I), no proposer P ∈ PA sends
a Prevote(A′, ·, P ) message for a distinct block A′ at height h(A) and hence no distinct
block A′ at height h(A) can receive > 2/3 prevotes. This also implies that we cannot have
h(A) = h(B) as there can only be ≤ 2/3 prevotes for B and hence no honest block proposer P
would send a Precommit(B, ·, P ) message by (II). Thus, the threshold of τB precommit
messages for block B cannot be reached and we must have h(A) < h(B).
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Figure 1: Block tree with two conflicting blocks A and B.
By (III), every block proposer P ∈ PA is only allowed to send a prevote message for a block
that is not a descendant of A if there is a block B¯ at height h(B¯) ≥ h(A) with Prevote(B¯, ·, ·)
messages by > 2/3 of the block proposers. As all block proposers in PA are honest, there have
to be > 2/3 prevotes for such a block B¯ by block proposers not in PA. This is a contradiction,
as PA is a set of > 1/3 block proposers by assumption. Hence, no block that is not a descendant
of A can obtain > 2/3 prevotes and thus no honest block proposer sends a precommit for B.
This means that the decision threshold of τB precommit messages for block B cannot be
reached contradicting that the honest block proposer PB decided for B.
Remark. Note that for ≥ 1/3 Byzantine block proposers consensus that guarantees both safety
and liveness in the partially synchronous system model is impossible as shown in [7]. This is
also the case for the consensus framework above because Byzantine block proposers can for
example not send any prevotes and thus prevent any decision for a block as the threshold of
> 2/3 prevotes is not reached. In order to have both the liveness and safety property, we hence
cannot have ≥ 1/3 Byzantine block proposers. The purpose of the flexible subjective decision
threshold is to allow for optimistic participants (those assuming a small fraction of Byzantine
block proposers) to decide for blocks earlier by only requiring a small decision threshold τP . On
the other hand, pessimistic participants can decide for a block only with a very high decision
threshold (with the risk of never making a decision if too many block proposers are Byzantine
or offline) with the guarantee that ≥ τP − 1/3 must violate the protocol rules for a conflicting
block to be decided. In particular, in the case that slashing conditions are added to punish
Byzantine proposers by burning their deposits, this allows to choose a decision threshold
depending on the desired safety guarantee in terms of deposit at stake.
3.3 Liveness
For proving the liveness condition of the consensus framework from Definition 3.1, we rely on
the partially synchronous system model. Recall that the basic assumption is that after the
global stabilization time of GST, all messages arrive reliably with a delay of at most ∆. We
assume that the time slots for block proposers to add blocks to the block tree have a duration
of at least 2∆. This way the underlying network is fast enough for the message about a new
block to reach every block proposer and all block proposers to send new prevote and precommit
messages that reach every other block proposer before the next block is proposed. This way,
all prevotes and precommits can be included in the next block and block proposers at regular
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times have the same information about the block tree (we assume that blocks, prevote and
precommit messages that were lost before time GST are simply rebroadcast).
Additionally, for the liveness property to hold, block proposers need to follow the same
fork choice rule, i.e., a rule that defines how the block proposers choose one branch of the
block tree as their current chain. More precisely, a fork choice rule is a function f that, given
the block tree TP of block proposer P (i.e., the block tree containing all blocks received by
block proposer P ) and the arrival times of all blocks as input, returns one branch of the block
tree TP . We refer to this branch as the canonical chain of TP . We say that a block proposer P
follows a fork choice rule f if it adds new proposed blocks to the canonical chain and only
sends prevote and precommit messages for blocks in the canonical chain. For the liveness proof,
we use the fork choice rule defined below.
Definition 3.3 (Longest-Chain). Let TP be the current block tree of block proposer P
and h¯ be the largest height of a block in TP with prevotes by > 2/3 of the block proposers
included in one branch of TP . Then the Longest-Chain fork choice rule returns the longest
branch that contains a block B¯ at height h¯ and Prevote(B¯, ·, ·) messages by > 2/3 of the
block proposers. Ties are broken in favor of the complete chain received first.
The essential property that the fork choice rule needs to satisfy is that the branch returned
always contains a block B¯ of largest height with prevote messages by > 2/3 of the block
proposers. The reason is that by (III), once a block proposer casts a precommit for B¯, it can
only prevote and precommit for blocks on the same branch as B¯ (unless there is a block of
height at least h(B¯) with > 2/3 prevotes). Thus, by requiring the canonical chain to include B¯,
the block proposers automatically satisfy (III) when casting prevotes and precommits. In
general, other fork choice rules that satisfy that the canonical chain always contains B¯ are
possible and yield the liveness property. An example is Immediate message-driven GHOST
proposed for Ethereum [2].
If < 1/3 of the block proposers are Byzantine, there can be at most one block at a given
height with > 2/3 prevotes by the the block proposers by (I). Thus, in this case B¯ in the
definition above is unique. Further, note that the tie-breaking in favor of the chain seen first is
rather arbitrary and also block hashes, i.e., identifiers associated with every block, can be used.
The main point of the tie-breaking is to have a rule that quickly makes the block tree change
to a state (by the new proposed blocks) where there are no more ties.
In the following theorem, we show liveness assuming a bound on the weight of crashed
block proposers. The reason for not considering Byzantine block proposers is that this would
require to make stronger assumptions on the block proposal mechanism. Furthermore, for a
concrete application of the general consensus framework it is usually necessary to show liveness
again for the concrete block proposal mechanism and additional rules how block proposers
send prevote and precommit messages.
Theorem 3.4 (Liveness). Assume that < 1/3 of the block proposers crash and all other block
proposers honestly follow the general consensus protocol and Longest-Chain fork choice rule.
Then for any l ∈ N, an honest block proposer P with decision threshold τP ∈ (1/3, 2/3] will
eventually decide on a block at height l.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary set of blocks proposed and prevotes as well as precommits cast
by all proposers with > 2/3 of the block proposers honestly following the consensus protocol
from Definition 3.1. Assume that we have reached time GST + 2∆. This means that all
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messages arrive reliably within time ∆ and all previously lost messages have been broadcast
again and received by all proposers. In particular, the block tree TP at the beginning of every
block proposal time slot is the same for every block proposer P . Note that due to lost or
delayed messages before time GST, there can initially be multiple chains of the same length
that contain a block of largest height with prevotes by > 2/3 of the block proposers. Because
of different arrival times of blocks, block proposers could decide for different canonical chains.
However, after the first block is proposed, these ties are broken and the Longest-Chain rule
yields the same canonical chain for every honest delegate.
Let l ∈ N and hmax be the largest height that any honest block proposer cast a prevote
for. We show that an honest block proposer P with decision threshold τP ∈ (1/3, 2/3] will
eventually decide on a block at height l. The canonical chain of all honest block proposers
continues growing until there are two consecutive blocks B1 and B2 added to the chain
with h(Bi) > max{l, hmax} for i = 1, 2.
We first show that any honest block proposer P can send a Prevote(B1, ·, P ) message.
Assume P previously cast a precommit message for a block B′. We show that the precommit
for B′ does not prevent P to prevote for B1. By assumption, B1 was added to the chain that
contains the block of largest height B¯ for which > 2/3 of the block proposers cast prevotes (at
the time when B1 is added to the chain). If B′ is on a branch not containing B¯, then by (III)
proposer P can prevote for B1 because we have h(B′) < h(B¯) as B′ must have > 2/3 prevotes
and B is the block of largest height with > 2/3 prevotes. Note that there can be at most one
block at every height with > 2/3 prevotes because of (I) and the fact that > 2/3 of the block
proposers honestly follow the protocol. If B′ is on the same branch as B, then by the choice
of B either B′ = B or B′ is an an ancestor of B. In both cases, the precommit for B′ allows P
to prevote for any descendants of B′, in particular, for B1. Thus, P can prevote for B1.
Therefore, all > 2/3 honest block proposers can send Prevote(B1, ·, ·) messages and these
messages reach all block proposers before the next block is proposed because we assume that
the block proposal time slots have duration > 2∆. This means that the honest proposer of B2
can include these prevote messages for B1 into the block B2. After receiving B2, all honest
block proposers can now send a Precommit(B1, ·, ·) messages. Hence, B1 receives precommits
by > 2/3 of the block proposers and any block proposer with decision threshold τ ∈ (1/3, 2/3]
will decide for B1 and all ancestors of B1. In particular, any honest block proposer will decide
for a block at height l since h(B1) > l. This shows the claim.
3.4 Accountability
We assume that all messages Prevote(B, T, P ) and Precommit(B, T, P ) are signed by the
block proposer P . Using the current chain up to block T , any block proposer can verify if
the messages sent by a block proposer P satisfy the consensus protocol rules (I)–(III). Note
that we assume that it is impossible that a block proposer sends a message exclusively to one
honest block proposer without all other block proposers eventually being able to learn about
it, as the underlying peer-to-peer network will gossip the messages to all block proposers.
3.5 Lightweight consensus messages
In this section, we describe how multiple prevote and precommit messages can be concisely
expressed via a single message, which we call an approve message. An Approve(k, p, T, P )
message contains a block T , two integers k, p ∈ N with k < h(T ) and p < h(T ) as well as
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the block proposer P sending the message. In an implementation, T can be the hash of the
block T and P the public key and signature of the message by block proposer P . Moreover, for
the message Approve(k, p, T, P ) to be valid, p must be the height of the block B¯ of largest
height that is an ancestor of T and the chain up to T includes prevotes by > 2/3 of the block
proposers for B¯. As a convention, we assume that the genesis block has prevotes by all block
proposers. The height p can be viewed as redundant information that can be derived from the
chain up to block T . However, it is essential for a simple expression of the protocol rules and
short proofs of any violation of the protocol rules. We now state the rules that block proposers
must satisfy when sending approve messages.
Definition 3.5 (Monotonicity-Rule). The approve messages by a block proposer P
satisfy the Monotonicity-Rule if for any two distinct messages Approve(k, p, T, P ) and
Approve(k′, p′, T ′, P ) with k ≤ k′ the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) It holds that h(T ) ≤ k′.
(ii) We have p ≤ p′.
Let B0, B1, . . . , Bl be the current chain of block proposer P and T = Br for r ∈ {0, 1, . . . , l}.
Then the intuition behind an Approve(k, p, T, P ) message is that P approves the blocks
Bk+1, Bk+1, . . . , Br. We require that k < h(T ) holds, such that a non-empty set of blocks up
to block T is approved. Now, condition (i) of the Monotonicity-Rule requires two approve
messages to be for blocks with disjoint sets of heights. Note that, in particular, we cannot have
k = k′ for two distinct messages as otherwise we would obtain h(T ) > k = k′. Moreover, (ii)
ensures that a block proposer only switches to another chain extending a different block with
> 2/3 prevotes if that block has no smaller height.
We now describe how an approve message translates to prevote and precommit messages.
Definition 3.6. Let B0, B1, . . . , Bl be one branch of the block tree of proposer P . Then
an Approve(k, p,Br, P ) message with r ∈ {k + 1, . . . , l} implies the following prevotes and
precommits:
(a) P casts a Prevote(A,Br, P ) for every block A ∈ {Bk+1, Bk+2, . . . , Br}.
(b) Considering the prevotes and precommits included in the chain C = B0, B1, . . . , Br
(given via approve messages), let
j1 := max ({0 ≤ s ≤ r | ∃ Precommit(Bs, ·, P ) in chain C} ∪ {−1})
j2 := max ({0 ≤ s ≤ k | @ Prevote(Bs, ·, P ) in chain C} ∪ {−1})
j := max {j1, j2}+ 1.
Then P casts a Precommit(A,Br, P ) for every block A in the set {Bj , . . . , Br} that
has (implied) prevotes by > 2/3 of the block proposers included in the chain C.
The idea is that the block proposer approves the blocks Bk+1, Bk+2, . . . , Br by prevoting
for them. Moreover, proposer P sends a maximum number of precommits for blocks starting
from its previous precommit while satisfying protocol rule (II). Note that for the precommits
in (b), it is important that only the prevotes in the chain C and not those cast in (a) are
taken into account, so that for any Precommit(A,Br, P ) we have h(A) ≤ p. This property is
needed in the proof of Lemma 3.7.
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Next, we show that if a block proposer satisfies the Monotonicity-Rule for the approve
messages, then the implied prevote and precommit messages satisfy the protocol rules from
Definition 3.1.
Lemma 3.7. If the approve messages by a block proposer P satisfies the Monotonicity-Rule
and P sends no additional prevote or precommit messages, then the prevotes and precommits
implied by the transformation in Definition 3.6 satisfy the protocol rules (I)–(III).
Proof. Consider two messages Approve(k, p, T, P ) and Approve(k′, p′, T ′, P ) with k ≤ k′.
Because of condition (i) of the Monotonicity-Rule, we have h(T ) ≤ k′ and thus
{k + 1, k + 2, . . . , h(T )} ∩ {k′ + 1, k′ + 2, . . . , h(T ′)} = ∅.
Therefore all prevotes are cast for blocks at distinct heights, i.e., (I) is satisfied.
Next, consider an arbitrary Precommit(A,Br, P ) that is cast according to the transfor-
mation of an Approve(k, p,Br, P ) message, where we use the notation from Definition 3.6.
We then have A ∈ {Bj , Bj+1, . . . , Br}, where j = max{j1, j2}+ 1. As j2 < j, proposer P must
have cast a prevote for A and by definition of the transformation there are Prevote(A, ·, ·)
messages by > 2/3 of the block proposers included in the chain up to Br. Hence, (II) is
satisfied for all precommit messages.
Finally, consider a Precommit(A, T, P ) message and a Prevote(A′, T ′, P ) message
with h(A) < h(A′). If A′ is a descendant of A, then (III) (a) is satisfied. Otherwise, we
must show that (III) (b) is satisfied, i.e., there exists a block B¯ at height h(B¯) ≥ h(A) with
Prevote(B¯, ·, ·) messages by > 2/3 of the block proposers contained in the blockchain up
to T ′.
From now on, assume that (III) (a) does not hold. Then both Precommit(A, T, P ) and
Prevote(A′, T ′, P ) cannot be implied by the same message Approve(k, p, T, P ), as otherwise
A′ is a descendant of A. Thus, there have to be two distinct messages Approve(k, p, T, P )
and Approve(k′, p′, T ′, P ) such that the first implies the message Precommit(A, T, P ) and
the second implies the message Prevote(A′, T ′, P ). As Prevote(A′, T ′, P ) is implied by
Approve(k′, p′, T ′, P ), we must have k′ < h(A′) ≤ h(T ′). For the sake of contradiction, let us
assume that k ≥ k′. Then the branch up to T cannot contain any implied prevote by P for a
block at height h(A′), because we assume that this branch does not contain A′ (otherwise again
A′ is a descendant of A), P already send a Prevote(A′, T ′, P ) message on a different branch
and (I) is satisfied. Using the notation from Definition 3.6, this implies that j2 ≥ h(A′) for the
chain C up to T . Therefore any precommit implied by the message Approve(k, p, T, P ) must
be for blocks at height larger than h(A′). This would mean h(A) > h(A′), a contradiction.
Hence, we must have k < k′.
As k < k′ holds, we must have p ≤ p′ by condition (ii) of the Monotonicity-Rule. Note
that we must have h(A) ≤ p as p is the largest height of a block with prevotes by > 2/3 of
the block proposers included in the chain up to T . Let B¯ be the block at height p′ that is
an ancestor of T ′. We have h(A) ≤ p ≤ p′ = h(B¯) and there are Prevote(B¯, ·, ·) messages
by > 2/3 of the block proposers contained in the blockchain up to T ′. Thus, (III) is also
satisfied.
By Lemma 3.7, the protocol rules (I)–(III) are satisfied when block proposers cast prevotes
and precommits implicitly via approve messages. This means that also Theorem 3.2 holds for
the case that block proposers only use approve messages for the consensus algorithm.
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Corollary 3.8. Assume for the consensus algorithm block proposers only use approve messages
that are transformed according to Definition 3.6 and for any honest proposer the approve
messages satisfy the Monotonicity-Rule. If there are < (τ − 1/3) Byzantine block proposers
for τ ∈ (1/3, 1], then any two honest block proposers with decision threshold at least τ never
decide for conflicting blocks.
3.6 Dynamic set of block proposers
So far, we only considered a static set of block proposers P . In blockchains, however, this set is
typically changing over time as block proposers may want to stop participating in proof-of-stake
and withdraw their deposit or different delegates get voted in the top ranks in a delegated
proof-of-stake system. The interesting question is what the implications of a dynamically
changing set of block proposers are for the safety and liveness guarantees from the last sections.
One approach is that a change of block proposers (e.g., because of withdrawals, deposits
or votes) is always possible and comes into effect without requiring any finality, i.e., without
requiring that the block or a descendant of the block containing the information of the change
of block proposers receives precommits by a certain threshold of block proposers. We discuss
this approach and prove some weaker safety guarantees for it.
Due to efficiency reasons, we only allow the set of block proposers to change at certain
heights and group blocks into rounds. We assume there is a constant m ∈ N>0 such that for
every r ∈ N the set of m integers {r ·m, r ·m+ 1, . . . , r ·m+m− 1} are associated with one
round. We then say that for a branch B0, B1, . . . , Bl of the block tree, where Bi has height i,
the m blocks Br·m, Br·m+1, . . . , Br·m+m−1 belong to round r. We further refer to Br·m as the
first block of round r and to Br·m+m−1 as the last block of round r. Considering one branch
of the block tree, the blocks of one round have an associated active set of block proposers P,
i.e., only a block proposer in the active set of block proposers P for a round r is allowed to
propose blocks and cast prevotes and precommits for the blocks of round r.
Furthermore, apart from a change in block proposers, it can happen that the weight ωP
associated with a block proposer P changes (e.g., due to a change in stake). For the following
results, we need to distinguish between the new and the unchanged block proposers. Hence, we
model an increase of weight of block proposer P from ωP to ω′P by assuming that a new block
proposer P ′ with weight ω′P − ωP is added to the new set of block proposers. Similarly, for a
decrease of weight from ωP to ω′P , we assume that the original set of block proposers contains
two block proposers P and P ′ with weights ωP ′ and ωP − ωP ′ , respectively. The change of
weight in this case is then modeled by P ′ leaving the set of block proposers. This allows us to
only consider a change in the set of block proposers and not additionally consider changes of
weights. Note that for any active set of block proposers P the weights always need to satisfy∑
P∈P ωP = 1.
Definition 3.9 (Unconstrained change of block proposers). We assume that there is an
initial set of block proposers for round 0 defined in the genesis block B0. Let d ∈ N be a
constant describing the delay in rounds when changes of block proposers take into effect.
For every round r with r > 0, the set of active block proposers for round r is defined
by the information in the current chain up to the last block of round r − (d + 1), i.e.,
block B(r−d−1)·m+m−1. Moreover, only the active block proposers at round r can propose
blocks at heights {r ·m, r ·m+ 1, . . . , r ·m+m− 1} and send prevote and precommit messages
for blocks at heights {r ·m, r ·m+ 1, . . . , r ·m+m− 1}.
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Note that for d = 0, the changes of block proposers take into effect immediately in the
next round. Moreover, if block proposers cast prevotes and precommits implicitly via approve
messages, then for a Approve(k, p,Br, P ) message to be valid we require P to be active in
the rounds associated to the blocks Bk+1, . . . , Br. This way any implied Prevote(A,Br, P )
cast according to Definition 3.6 is for a block A where P is active. As a precommit is only
implied if P previously made an implicit prevote, it holds that also all implied precommits are
for blocks where P is active.
We now show sufficient conditions for the safety and liveness property for the case of block
proposers that change according to the mechanism described above.
Theorem 3.10. Let P1,P2, . . . ,Ps be the sets of block proposers that are active in any round
on any branch. Then the following properties hold:
(a) If
⋂s
i=1 Pi contains at least > (4/3 − τ) honest block proposers, then two honest block
proposer in
⋃s
i=1 Pi with decision threshold at least τ ∈ (1/3, 1] never decide for conflicting
blocks (Safety).
(b) Assume that < 1/3 of the block proposers in Pi crash and all other block proposers in Pi
honestly follow the general consensus protocol and Longest-Chain fork choice rule.
While the block proposers Pi are active, it is possible for any block proposer P ∈ Pi with
decision threshold τP ∈ (1/3, 2/3] to decide on new blocks assuming the global stabilization
time is reached (Liveness).
Proof. The proof of the first part of the claim is similar to the proof of Theorem 3.2. Assume,
for the sake of contradiction, that there are two conflicting blocks A and B as well as an honest
block proposer PA ∈
⋃s
i=1 Pi with decision threshold τA deciding for A and an honest block
proposers PB ∈
⋃s
i=1 Pi with decision threshold τB deciding for B. Let further PA be the
set of active block proposers associated with block A and similarly PB be the set of active
block proposers associated with block B. By assumption we have τ ≤ τA and τ ≤ τB. Hence,
there must be Precommit(A, ·, ·) messages cast by > τ of the block proposers in PA and also
Precommit(B, ·, ·) messages cast by > τ of the block proposers in PB.
Let PH be the set of > (4/3− τ) honest block proposers that is contained in
⋂s
i=1 Pi by
assumption. In particular, we have PH ⊆ PA ∩PB . There are < 1− (4/3− τ) = τ − 1/3 block
proposers in PA that are not contained in PH and thus there are > 1/3 block proposers in PH
that sent a Precommit(A, ·, ·) message. Analogously, there are also > 1/3 block proposers
in PH that must have sent a Precommit(B, ·, ·) message.
Without loss of generality, we assume h(A) ≤ h(B). Let P¯H ⊆ PH be the subset of
> 1/3 block proposers that send a precommit for A. By (II), every proposer P ∈ P¯H must
have also cast a Prevote(A, ·, P ) message. Thus, by (I), no proposer in P ∈ P¯H sends a
prevote for any other block at height h(A). We must therefore have h(A) < h(B) as otherwise
B cannot obtain > 2/3 prevotes because P¯H is contained in every active set of block proposers.
By (III), every block proposer P ∈ P¯H is only allowed to send a prevote message for
a block that is not a descendant of A if there is a block B¯ at height h(B¯) ≥ h(A) with
Prevote(B¯, ·, ·) messages by > 2/3 of the block proposers. As all block proposers in P¯H are
honest, there have to be > 2/3 prevotes for such a block B¯ by block proposers not in P¯H . This
is a contradiction, as P¯H is a set of > 1/3 block proposers that is contained in any active set
of block proposers. Hence, no block that is not a descendant of A can obtain > 2/3 prevotes
and thus no honest block proposer sends a precommit for B. This means that the decision
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threshold of τB precommit messages for block B cannot be reached contradicting that the
honest block proposer PB decided for B.
For the liveness property, the change of block proposers is not relevant and we obtain the
result directly from Theorem 3.4.
The above theorem shows that the safety guarantee is only slightly weaker if only a small
fraction of the block proposers change. However, several changes of a small fraction of block
proposers over time could amount to almost all block proposers changing. The following result
shows that as long as the block proposers finalize blocks in between these changes of block
proposers, we can improve the safety guarantee above.
Theorem 3.11. Let α ∈ (0, 1/3) and τ ∈ (1/3 + 2α, 1]. Let B,B′ be two blocks in one branch
such that B′ is the descendant of B with minimal height such that the chain up to B′ contains
> τ precommits for a descendant of B. We assume that between all such pairs of blocks B and
B′ in the block tree < α honest proposers in the active set of block proposers change. If there
are > 4/3− τ + 2α honest block proposers in any active set of block proposers, then two block
proposers with decision threshold at least τ never decide for conflicting blocks.
Proof. As the set of block proposers is changing over time, there can now be blocks at the
same height which assume a different set of block proposers. For instance, one chain may
contain the information regarding a change of block proposers, whereas another chain does
not. Thus, we now associate a unique active set of block proposers to every block of the block
tree, which is determined using the rule given in Definition 3.9.
Let us assume, for the sake of contradiction, that there are two conflicting blocks B1
and B2 such that an honest block proposer P1 with decision threshold τ1 decides for B1 and
another honest block proposers P2 with decision threshold τ2 decides for B2. Let A0 be the
block of largest height that is a common ancestor of B1 and B2. Moreover, let A1 be the
first descendant of A0 on the branch containing B1 that has τ precommits contained in that
branch. Similarly, let A2 be the first descendant of A0 on the branch containing B2 that has
τ precommits contained in that branch. The setting is shown in Figure 2. As τ1 ≥ τ , there
must be at least τ precommits for B1 contained in the branch containing B1 and therefore we
must have A1 = B1 or A1 is an ancestor of B1. The same holds for A2 and B2. Without loss
of generality let h(A1) ≤ h(A2).
For i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, let Pi be the set of block proposers associated with Ai. By assumption,
< α honest block proposers change before a block on a branch receives > τ precommits and
there are > 4/3− τ + 2α honest block proposers in any active set of block proposers. Thus,
P0∩Pi contains a subset of > 4/3−τ +α honest block proposers. Hence, P1∩P2 must contain
a subset PH of honest block proposers of weight > 4/3− τ that is also contained in the active
set of proposers associated to any block on the path from A0 to A1 or the path from A0 to A2.
By assumption, there are Precommit(A1, ·, ·) by > τ of the block proposers in the chain
containing B1 and P1 contains < τ − 1/3 proposers not contained in PH . Therefore, there
must be a subset P ′H ⊆ PH of > 1/3 honest block proposers that cast a precommit for A1.
This also implies that we cannot have h(A1) = h(A2) as there can only be ≤ 2/3 prevotes
for A2 and hence no honest block proposer P ∈ P2 would cast a Precommit(A2, ·, P ) by (II).
Thus, the threshold of τ precommits for block A2 cannot be reached in this case and we must
have h(A1) < h(A2).
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Figure 2: Block tree with two conflicting blocks B1 and B2.
By (III), every block proposer P ∈ P ′H is only allowed to send a prevote message for
a block that is not a descendant of A1 if there is a block B¯ at height h(B¯) ≥ h(A1) with
Prevote(B¯, ·, ·) messages by > 2/3 of the block proposers. As all block proposers in P ′H are
honest, there have to be > 2/3 prevotes for such a block B¯ by block proposers not in P ′H . This
is a contradiction, as P ′H is a set of > 1/3 block proposers that is contained in the active set
of proposers associated with every block on the path from A0 to A2. Hence, no block that is
not a descendant of A1 can obtain > 2/3 prevotes and thus no honest block proposers sends
a precommit for A2. This means that the threshold of τ precommits for block A2 cannot be
reached, which is a contradiction.
Remark. Theorem 3.11 outlines a way how we can maintain close to optimal safety guarantees
while allowing dynamic block proposers. Assume that we only allow a change of block proposers
with overall weight < 1/100 at a time, i.e., after a change of block proposers from P to P ′ we
require the new set of block proposers P ′ to finalize a block before another change of block
proposers can occur. If we assume that we always have > 2/3 + 2/100 honest block proposers
at any given time, then Theorem 3.11 yields that the safety property is satisfied.
Allowing an arbitrary large change of block proposers at a given time while preserving
the safety property under the assumption that at any time > 2/3 of the block proposers are
honest, requires a much more complex mechanism of two set of block proposers, i.e., both P
and P ′, to vote on the same blocks. For the Casper the Friendly Finality Gadget consensus
algorithm this approach is sketched in [4].
4 Lisk-Bft consensus protocol
We now describe Lisk-Bft, a proposed consensus protocol for the Lisk blockchain, which
is based on the general consensus framework from the last section. Lisk uses a delegated
proof-of-stake system, where 101 block proposers, which are referred to as active delegates,
are determined via voting. The delegates have uniform weights ωP = 1/101 for all P ∈ P.
The condition > 2/3 delegates therefore translates to at least 68 delegates and threshold
< 1/3 delegates to at most 33 delegates. Moreover, 101 consecutive blocks are grouped into
one round in Lisk and block proposal slots of one round are assigned in a round-robin fashion.
Instead of using separate consensus messages, all prevotes and precommits are implied
by two additional integers added to blocks using the same idea as the lightweight consensus
messages introduced in the last section. Hence, the additional two integers in the block headers
are the only overhead of the Lisk-Bft consensus protocol.
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Definition 4.1 (Lisk-Bft). Let C := B0, B1, . . . , Bl−1 be the current chain of delegate P
and h0 ∈ {0, 1, . . . , l} be the height of the first block of the round since when P has been
continuously active delegate.
1. When P proposes block Bl as a child of Bl−1, it adds the following information to the
block header:
hprevious The largest height of a block that P previously proposed (on any branch)
and 0 if P has not proposed any block.
hprevoted The height of the block of largest height with at least 68 prevotes in the
current chain B0, B1, . . . , Bl−1.
In general, for a block B we use the notation hprevious(B) and hprevoted(B) to refer to
the values above.
2. If hprevious(Bl) < h(Bl) holds, then the information in the block header of Bl implies
prevotes and precommits for blocks in the following order:
(a) Let k := max{hprevious(Bl), h0 − 1, l − 303}. Then the block header implies a
Prevote(A,Bl, P ) for every block A ∈ {Bk+1, Bk+2, . . . , Bl}.
(b) Considering the implied prevotes and precommits included in the chain C (via the
additional information in the block headers), let
j1 := max ({0 ≤ s ≤ l | ∃ Precommit(Bs, ·, P ) in chain C} ∪ {−1})
j2 := max ({0 ≤ s ≤ hprevious(Bl) | @ Prevote(Bs, ·, P ) in chain C} ∪ {−1})
j := max {j1, j2, h0 − 1, l − 303}+ 1.
Then the block header implies a Precommit(A,Bl, P ) for every block A in the
set {Bj , . . . , Bl} that has prevotes by at least 68 delegates included in the chain C.
3. A block B and all ancestors of B are finalized if there are precommits for B by at
least 68 delegates included in the chain C.
4. The active delegates of round r are determined taking all votes included in the blockchain
up to the end of round r − 3 into account (without requiring finality).
5. Delegates follow the Longest-Chain rule, where the block of largest height with at
least 68 prevotes in a chain A0, A1, . . . , As is computed taking only the prevotes implied
by blocks A0, A1, . . . , As−1, and not those implied by As, into account.
The Lisk-Bft protocol is an application of the general consensus framework from the
last section, where delegates only cast prevotes and precommits via the additional infor-
mation in the block headers. The values hprevious and hprevoted in the block header of
block Bl correspond to the delegate P first proposing block Bl and afterwards sending
the message Approve(hprevious, hprevoted, Bl, P ). However, the transformation of the header
information to prevote and precommit messages above contains two modifications com-
pared to the transformation for approve messages in Definition 3.6. First of all, we have
k = max{hprevious, h0− 1, l− 303} instead of k = hprevious. The reason for enforcing k ≥ h0− 1
is to ensure that the implied prevotes are only for blocks at heights where delegate P was
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active. We further enforce k ≥ l − 303 for performance reasons so that it is sufficient to
consider the last 303 blocks when updating the number of prevotes for blocks. Note that the
parameter 303 is chosen due to the fact that a block can be finalized after 302 additional
blocks are added on top (see the liveness proof of Theorem 4.4), but depending on the ordering
of delegates in a round, 201 additional blocks are not always sufficient. Secondly, we have
j = max {j1, j2, h0 − 1, l − 303}+ 1 instead of j := max {j1, j2}+ 1. Again, this ensures that
all implied precommits are for blocks where P was active and also for performance reasons
all precommits are only for a subset of the last 303 blocks. Overall, it is important to note
that the prevotes and precommits implied by the transformation above are a subset of the
prevotes and precommits implied according to Definition 3.6 when instead sending the message
Approve(hprevious, hprevoted, Bl, P ).
A subtlety of the transformation 2 (b) above is that we consider only the prevotes implied
by all blocks up to Bl−1 and not the prevotes implied by 2 (a). This is analogous to the
transformation for approve messages in Definition 3.6.
We establish some basic properties of the Lisk-Bft protocol in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.2. Let B1 and B2 be two distinct blocks proposed by an honest delegate P according
to the Lisk-Bft protocol. Then the following properties hold:
(a) The Longest-Chain rule implies that a branch with tip B is chosen over a branch with
tip A, if the following conditions are satisfied:
hprevoted(B) > hprevoted(A) or (hprevoted(B) = hprevoted(A) and h(B) > h(A)) .
(b) If B1 is proposed before B2, then the following inequalities hold:
hprevious(B1) ≤ hprevious(B2), hprevoted(B1) ≤ hprevoted(B2), h(B1) ≤ hprevious(B2).
(c) If B1 is proposed before B2 and hprevoted(B1) = hprevoted(B2) holds, then we must
have h(B1) < h(B2).
(d) Block B1 is proposed before B2 if and only if
(hprevious(B1), hprevoted(B1), h(B1)) <lex (hprevious(B2), hprevoted(B2), h(B2)), (1)
where <lex is the lexicographical ordering.
(e) If any two blocks by delegate P satisfy the inequalities in (b), then the implied prevotes
and precommits according to the Lisk-Bft protocol satisfy the conditions of the general
consensus framework in Definition 3.1.
Proof. (a) According to the Longest-Chain rule, the first deciding factor is the largest
height of a block with at least 68 prevotes contained in some branch of the block tree.
For a chain with tip A, the largest height of a block with at least 68 prevotes is given
by hprevoted(A) because the prevotes implied by the block header of A are not taken into
account. If there are multiple chains that contain a block with at least 68 prevotes of the
same height, then the longer chain containing these prevotes has priority according to
the Longest-Chain rule. This immediately yields the condition in the claim.
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(b) As B2 is proposed after B1 and the largest height of a block previously proposed is
non-decreasing, we must have hprevious(B1) ≤ hprevious(B2). As delegate P follows
the Longest-Chain rule, the tips of the canonical chain of P satisfy that hprevoted(·)
is non-decreasing by claim (a). Thus, we must have hprevoted(B1) ≤ hprevoted(B2).
Moreover, when proposing B2, the largest height of a block previously proposed must be
at least h(B1). This implies h(B1) ≤ hprevious(B2).
(c) By claim (a), every time delegate P switches to a different chain, either hprevoted(·) is
strictly increasing or it remains unchanged and the height of the tip strictly increases.
The same holds every time a new child is added to the tip of the chain of delegate P
(either proposed by P or another delegate). Thus, if hprevoted(B1) = hprevoted(B2) holds,
then we must have h(B1) < h(B2).
(d) Assume B1 is proposed before B2. By claim (b), we must have hprevious(B1) ≤
hprevious(B2) and hprevoted(B1) ≤ hprevoted(B2). Moreover, by (c), we have h(B1) < h(B2)
if hprevoted(B1) = hprevoted(B2). Thus, Inequality (1) must hold. The other direction
follows by contraposition.
(e) We need to show that the implied prevotes and precommits according to the trans-
formation in Definition 4.1 satisfy the protocol rules (I)–(III) of the general consensus
framework. The proof works analogous to the proof of Lemma 3.7.
Let T and T ′ be two distinct blocks proposed by a delegate P , where T ′ is proposed
after T . By claim (b), we have h(T ) ≤ hprevious(T ′). Any Prevote(A, T, P ) implied
by T satisfies h(A) ≤ h(T ) and any Prevote(A′, T ′, P ) implied by T ′ satisfies h(A′) >
hprevious(T
′) ≥ h(T ). This means that all implied prevotes are for distinct heights, i.e.,
(I) is satisfied.
Next, consider some Precommit(A,Bl, P ) implied by a block Bl, where we use the
notation from Definition 4.1. We then have h(A) > j2 and hence P must have cast a
prevote for A (implied by 2 (a) or a previous block by P in the current chain). By the
definition of the transformation there are at least 68 prevotes for A in the chain up
to Bl−1. Hence, (II) is satisfied for all precommit messages.
Finally, for showing (III), consider a Precommit(A, T, P ) and a Prevote(A′, T ′, P )
with h(A) < h(A′) implied by two blocks T and T ′. If A′ is a descendant of A, then (III)
is satisfied. Otherwise, we must show that there exists a block B¯ at height h(B¯) ≥ h(A)
with Prevote(B¯, ·, ·) by at least 68 of the delegates contained in the blockchain up to
block T ′.
We first show that T ′ must be proposed after T . Assume, for the sake of contradiction,
that T ′ is proposed before T . By claim (b), we then have h(T ′) ≤ hprevious(T ) < h(T )
and, in particular, h(A′) ≤ h(T ′) < h(T ). By our assumption, A′ is not a descendant of A
so A′ cannot be on the branch containing A and T . But then the branch containing A and
T does not contain any prevote for a block at height h(A′) because (I) is satisfied. This
means that any precommit implied by T must be for blocks at height at least h(A′) + 1,
which contradicts h(A) < h(A′) and that Precommit(A, T, P ) is implied by T . Hence,
T ′ must be proposed after T .
By claim (b), we then obtain hprevoted(T ) ≤ hprevoted(T ′). We further have h(A) ≤
hprevoted(T ) because hprevoted(T ) is the largest height of a block with prevotes by 68 of
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the delegates included in the chain up to T . Let B¯ be the block at height hprevoted(T ′)
that is an ancestor of T ′. We have h(A) ≤ hprevoted(T ) ≤ hprevoted(T ′) = h(B¯) and
there are Prevote(B¯, ·, ·) by at least 68 delegates contained in the blockchain up to T ′.
Thus, (III) is also satisfied.
Let A and B be two distinct blocks proposed by a delegate P . Using Lemma 4.2 (d), we
can derive which of the blocks was proposed first assuming that delegate P honestly follows the
Lisk-Bft protocol. We call the blocks A and B contradicting if, assuming this proposal order,
they do not satisfy one of the inequalities in Lemma 4.2 (b) or the condition of Lemma 4.2 (c).
Lemma 4.2 directly yields the following two properties: The blocks proposed by an honest
delegate are never contradicting. Secondly, if none of the blocks of a delegate are contradicting,
then the implied prevotes and precommits satisfy the conditions of the general consensus
framework in Definition 3.1 due to Lemma 4.2 (e). Hence, in order to detect whether the
implied prevotes and precommits of a delegate violate the general consensus framework, it is
sufficient to check whether any pair of blocks by that delegate is contradicting.
Note that we obtain all properties in the above paragraph if we only require blocks to
satisfy all inequalities in Lemma 4.2 (b). A violation of Lemma 4.2 (c) only implies a violation
of the fork choice rule, but not that the prevotes and precommits violate the general consensus
framework. For the liveness property, it is, however, important that delegates choose one chain
according to the fork choice rule and, in particular, do not forge multiple blocks with the same
height and the same hprevoted on different chains because this causes a tie in the fork choice
rule if the blocks are at the tip of the chains.
The next lemma allows to reduce the number of checks to ensure that the blocks of a
delegate are not contradicting. Instead of checking the inequalities in Lemma 4.2 (b) and the
condition of Lemma 4.2 (c) for any pair of blocks by the same delegate, it is sufficient to only
check pairs of successive blocks by the same delegate in one chain.
Lemma 4.3. Let C := B0, B1, . . . , Bl be a chain of blocks and Bi, Bj , Bk blocks forged by
delegate P such that 0 ≤ i < j < k ≤ l. If the pairs of blocks (Bi, Bj) and (Bj , Bk) are not
contradicting, then the pair of blocks (Bi, Bk) is also not contradicting.
Proof. By assumption, we have hprevious(Bi) ≤ hprevious(Bj) and hprevious(Bj) ≤ hprevious(Bk).
We therefore obtain hprevious(Bi) ≤ hprevious(Bk). The same argument shows hprevoted(Bi) ≤
hprevoted(Bk). We further have h(Bi) ≤ hprevious(Bj) ≤ hprevious(Bk) and therefore (Bi, Bk)
satisfies all three inequalities in Lemma 4.2 (b).
Moreover, if hprevoted(Bi) = hprevoted(Bk) holds, then we must have both hprevoted(Bi) =
hprevoted(Bj) and hprevoted(Bj) = hprevoted(Bk). This implies h(Bi) < h(Bj) and h(Bj) < h(Bk)
by assumption. Hence, we also have h(Bi) < h(Bk) implying that Bi and Bk are not
contradicting.
Using Lemma 4.2, we now show the desired safety, liveness and accountability properties
of the Lisk-Bft protocol. Note that for showing the liveness property we assume that at
most 33 delegates are offline, i.e., not forging any blocks, and we do not consider Byzantine
delegates. As delegates cast prevotes and precommits together with the block proposal in the
Lisk-Bft protocol, Byzantine delegates could intentionally create competing branches in the
block tree so that the prevotes and precommits of some honest delegates are not considered as
their block is not eventually included in the canonical chain. Such an attack would only be
successful if a substantial number of Byzantine delegates coordinate the creation of competing
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branches and at regular times multiple Byzantine delegates can consecutive propose blocks
so that the competing chain becomes longer than the chain previously forged by the honest
delegates. We believe that such an attack is rather unlikely as it requires a lot of coordination
and a favorable delegate ordering for the attackers. Further, it only effects the liveness property,
but not the safety property.
Theorem 4.4. The Lisk-Bft protocol has the following properties:
(a) Let P1,P2, . . . ,Ps be distinct sets of active delegates over time. If
⋂s
i=1 Pi contains at
least 68 honest delegates, then two honest delegates in
⋃s
i=1 Pi never finalize conflicting
blocks.
(b) Assume that at most m ∈ {1, . . . , 16} honest delegates change without a block obtaining
68 precommits by the active delegates and assume at any time there are 68 + 2m honest
delegates contained in the active set of delegates. Then two honest delegates never finalize
conflicting blocks.
(c) If at most 33 delegates are offline and all other delegates honestly follow the Lisk-Bft
protocol, then for every l ∈ N an honest delegate eventually finalizes a block at height l
(assuming the global stabilization time GST is reached and there are regular intervals of
303 consecutive blocks with an unchanged subset of 68 active honest delegates).
(d) If a Byzantine delegate forges blocks such that the implied prevotes and precommits violate
the general consensus framework, then this protocol violation can be detected and the
Byzantine delegate can be identified.
Proof. By Lemma 4.2, the implied prevotes and precommits in the Lisk-Bft protocol satisfy
the Lisk-Bft protocol rules (I)–(III). Applying Theorem 3.10 for τ = 2/3 yields the first claim.
For the second claim, we apply Theorem 3.11 with τ = 2/3 and α = m/101.
For the liveness property in the third claim, consider an arbitrary state of the block tree
and an arbitrary set of blocks proposed according to the Lisk-Bft protocol. Moreover, we
assume that we have reached the global stabilization time GST so that all message arrive
reliably within time ∆. Let further l ∈ N and hmax be the largest height that any honest
delegate proposed a block for. We show that an honest delegate eventually finalizes a block at
height l.
After time GST, all honest delegates are aware of all competing chains. There could
be multiple competing chains for which hprevious(·) and h(·) of the tip of the chain is the
same, but one block proposed by an honest delegate always breaks these ties. Afterwards,
in every proposal slot, there is one unique block A such that for every other block A′ either
hprevoted(A) > hprevoted(A
′) or hprevoted(A) = hprevoted(A′) and h(A) > h(A′) holds. This
means A is the tip of the canonical chain of every honest delegate.
This canonical chain of all honest delegates will continue growing until it contains a block B
at height h(B) > max{l, hmax}. We assume that there is a subset PH of at least 68 honest
delegates that is also in the sets of active delegates associated with the subsequent 302 blocks.
We show that after first 67 distinct delegates in PH and then another 68 distinct delegates
in PH add a block as descendant of B, block B is finalized. As all delegates add blocks to the
same chain and any round contains blocks by at least 68 distinct delegates (at most 33 are
offline), this happens within the next 302 blocks added as descendant to B.
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Any block B′ by an honest delegate P ∈ PH that build on B satisfies hprevious(B′) < h(B) if
P did not propose B or another descendant of B already. By the transformation in Definition 4.1,
B′ implies a prevote for B as P was active at height h(B) and h(B′)− h(B) ≤ 302. Hence,
once there are 68 distinct delegates in PH that either proposed B or added a block to the
chain extending B, block B has received 68 prevotes. Any subsequent block B′ by an honest
delegate P ∈ PH implies a precommit by P for B, because according to the transformation in
Definition 4.1 we have
• j2 < h(B), as all honest proposers added blocks to the same chain extending B,
• j1 < h(B), because otherwise P already made a precommit for B,
• h0 ≤ h(B), since all delegates in PH are continuously active,
• h(B′)− h(B) ≤ 302, as argued above.
Hence after another set of 68 distinct blocks in PH are added to the chain, there are 68 pre-
commits for B. This means that B and all ancestors of B are finalized by any honest delegate.
In particular, any honest delegate finalizes a block at height l as h(B) > l.
For the last claim, note that Lemma 4.2 (b) states the conditions that must hold if a delegate
follows the Lisk-Bft protocol. By Lemma 4.2 (e), these are also sufficient for the implied
prevotes and precommits to satisfy (I)–(III) of the general consensus framework. In order to
determine whether the implied prevotes and precommits of blocks forged by a delegate P obey
the protocol rules (I)–(III), it is therefore sufficient to consider every pair of blocks B1 and B2
proposed by P , determine which one was proposed first according to Lemma 4.2 (d), and then
check if the inequalities given in Lemma 4.2 (b) hold.
5 Conclusion
We introduced a general consensus framework for blockchains which allows to prove safety and
liveness depending on the number of Byzantine block proposers. As a concrete application of
the consensus framework we defined the Lisk-Bft protocol, which allows to obtain strong
guarantees with respect to safety and liveness while requiring no additional messages for the
consensus as the necessary information is efficiently encoded in the block headers.
Another interesting possible application of the general consensus framework could be to
combine it together with a suitable aggregate signature scheme. For instance, block proposers
could send a Approve(h(Bl)− 1, ·, Bl, P ) message for the block they believe to be the correct
block at height l. Using an aggregate signature scheme, these messages could be efficiently
aggregated in the network and only added to any child block of Bl by the next proposer.
Applying the properties of the general consensus framework analogous to the case of the
Lisk-Bft protocol, it is possible to show that a block can be finalized already after two
additional blocks are added as descendants.
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